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Abstract: The main problem for the patient who wants to have access to all of the 
information about his health is that this information is very often spread over many 
medical records. Therefore, it would be convenient for the patient, after being 
identified and authenticated, to use a kind of specific medical search engine as one 
part of the solution to this main problem. The principal objective is for the patient 
to have access to his or her medical information at anytime and wherever it has 
been stored. This proposal for secure "Google Like" access requires the addition of 
different conditions: very strict identity checks using cryptographic techniques 
such as those planned for the electronic signature, which will not only ensure 
authentication of the patient and integrity of the file, but also protection of the 
confidentiality and access follow-up. The electronic medical record must also be 
electronically signed by the practitioner in order to provide evidence that he has 
given his agreement and accepted responsibility for the content. This electronic 
signature also prevents any kind of post-transmission falsification. New advances 
in technology make it possible to envisage access to medical records anywhere and 
anytime, thanks to Grid and watermarking methodologies.  
Keywords: data security, electronic signature, direct access, medical record, 
patient identifier, watermarking, grid 
Introduction  
Throughout Europe, patients are entitled to have direct access to their medical records 
and this has been true, even in France where previously only indirect access via a 
physician was allowed, since 4 March 2002. At present, the simplest solution is to give 
patients a copy of their paper medical record or, if it has been computerised, to give 
them a printed record or even a copy on a machine readable storage medium. This 
arrangement of the communication process can be carried out “without constraint at 
reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or expense” as required by article 12 
of the Directive “On the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data” [1]. The time taken to grant 
access provides the opportunity to ensure that the identity of the individual making the 
request can be properly authenticated and that any additional conditions on access, such 
as those provided for in article 13 section 1(g) “for the protection of the Data Subject or 
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the rights and freedoms of others” have been correctly observed. This current approach 
does not involve any particular risk to the information system, but there are already 
pressing demands from patients with their increasingly powerful computing facilities to 
speed up these processes, and to have direct access to medical record systems. These 
pressures will be difficult to resist in the present, fast moving, electronic environment 
and it is difficult to imagine that the traditional, delayed, process will be accepted for 
much longer. Soon, patients will be expecting to have direct access to their medical 
files via the internet or its equivalent. Instead of trying to resist this inescapable 
evolution, it is preferable to seek solutions that provide safety for both patients and 
medical record systems while allowing this valuable development in the area of 
personal freedom and human rights. 
The French project to implement personal medical records called DMP for each patient 
and accessible to the patient has raised many difficulties such as defining a common 
identifier for all health care purposes and structures and centralizing storage of all 
records. The French health authorities are today redefining the scope of their project 
taking into account the results of the first experimentation in day-to-day practice. The 
proposed solution of “google-like” management (providing patients with permanent 
access to their medical information wherever it has been stored) is an alternative to 
centralised storage but needs a very high level of security. This paper sets out to define 
steps in the process of creating a system, similar to a search engine, that will provide 
patients with secure access to their medical records. 
 
1. Proposal for Secure « Google Like » Access 
Today, the main problem for the patient who wants to have full access to his or her 
health information is that this information is very often spread over many medical 
records kept by different health structures or professionals that even the patient doesn’t 
remember anymore. Therefore, it would be convenient for the patient, and for his 
medical practitioner, after being identified and authenticated, to use a kind of specific 
medical search engine to gain access to the medical information of the patient wherever 
it has been stored. To provide this access, there are many possibilities. Our proposal 
relies on two procedures. In the first, the patient authorizes his/her medical practitioner 
to have access to his/her medical information. As happened in France for the Personal 
Medical Record (DMP) project, the issue of access to sensitive information (such as 
HIV, psychiatric diseases, sexual abuses) may be raised. In the second, the patient has 
direct access to his/her medical data and selects the information that he wants to 
communicate to his medical practitioner, so that there is no need for the patient to ask 
for sensitive information to be masked. 
In a utopian world, access could be linked to a procedure ideally using a digital 
signature provided by a patient's medical smart card. More basically, it could be 
sufficient to incorporate in this secure “google-like” access, the same process of 
security that has been incorporated in our credit card and that we use daily when we 
want to have access to our bank account or withdraw money. The main difference with 
the banking system will be the need for card and access management in order to make 
it impossible for healthcare information networks to be organised in such a way that the 
patient is obliged to stay in the network if he wants to keep his “on line” access to his 
medical record. This risk does not exist in countries where medicine is managed 
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exclusively by public organisations, but information management may be an important 
issue when different private healthcare providers compete. 
2. Conditions of implementation 
2.1 Authentication of patients and health professionals before access to medical 
records on line 
Direct access to medical files via electronic media gives rise to many difficulties, and 
hence very strict access control and authentication measures are essential. The principal 
difficulty in this field is to ensure that only the holder of the access rights will be able 
to gain access to the Personal Data. Access control for patients is considerably more 
complex than for health professionals. For example, in hospitals, the management can 
encourage administrative and medical staff to participate in relevant training courses. 
In contrast, patients would have to be provided with intuitive, foolproof access 
facilities, without requiring them to participate in any training courses. The difference 
between facilities designed for “doctor or nurse” access and facilities designed for 
“patient or general public” access is substantial even though the number of applications 
and functions available to the patient would, of course, be far smaller than that 
available to and required by members of staff. 
A brief consideration of the risks associated with unlawful access to Medical Record 
systems for patients and the healthcare organization makes it clear that a very reliable 
authentication system will be required before allowing any public access to such 
systems. The traditional approach for the authentication of individuals has two 
components: assertion of identity, followed by proof of the identity [1]. Generally, this 
proof can be in terms of something that the individual knows or something that the 
individual has or something that the individual is. Technical solutions are available to 
cover any degree of proof in authenticating individuals, but many of them would 
require the establishment of a substantial organization before they could become 
effective.  
Biometric technologies are sometimes proposed as a way to associate a patient with his 
or her medical data, as they do not require the patient to bring any documents or 
remember any information. Though this technology represents real progress both in the 
identification and in the authentication of the patient, there are still many questions [2]
 
regarding the accuracy and reliability of each biometric technology and the associated 
costs. But the main problem lies in the acceptability of such systems by organizations 
concerned with ethical considerations such as patients' associations, national ethics 
committees, human rights associations, and national committees for data protection. 
For example, in France, the use of biometric solutions for identification in the field of 
health has not been approved by the National Ethics Committee.  
Even today, after extensive computerization of Medical Record systems, the simplest 
and most common authentication mechanism is still that of an “Identifier” together 
with a “Password”. This approach combines simplicity of use and management, but it 
is the weakest and the most unsatisfactory mechanism [3]. The most satisfactory 
approach would lie in the creation of an individual chip card, including the electronic 
signature cryptographic algorithms [4], both for patients and health professionals. But 
this will take some time and will engender considerable expenditure before becoming 
the accepted standard. Moreover, due to the legal recognition of the electronic 
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signature, this partial solution would provide access follow-up, with legal value of 
proof in front of the courts. However, as this more satisfactory electronic solution 
cannot be implemented now and everywhere, only inferior less safe solutions can be 
considered. For example, the electronic signature has just been retained in France for 
the access of health care professionals, but due to technical aspects the implementation 
of this electronic signature has been scheduled for a period of 3 years (French decree 
on confidentiality dated May, 15th, 2007).  
Meanwhile, a possible solution is a smart card [5-7], associated with the attribution of a 
secret PIN code with 8 characters, like that used in France for the DMP project. This 
solution would require hospitals to be equipped with powerful firewall-type data-
processing devices to filter access. In such a system, the patient commonly declares the 
list of medical practitioners who are authorized to have permanent access to his 
medical data. The access rights given to the medical practitioners can be erased at any 
time by the patient. For other medical practitioners consulted by the patient, the patient 
authorizes temporary access.  
In the case of an emergency, when the patient is unable to express his will, the 
easiest solution is to provide access through a specific procedure involving the 
responsibility of the medical practitioner in charge of the patient, with immediate 
notification to an official security supervisor. People may argue against this solution as 
even though the medical practitioner can be prosecuted in case of illegal access, 
security has been breached. This partial solution represents a compromise between 
security rules and the patient’s health care and arises from the fact that collected data is 
made available. It is a general principle of penal law to consider that citizens generally 
act in accordance with social rules and that penalties are imposed as a deterrent and to 
punish those who break the law. 
 
 
2.2 Verification of the data source 
2.2.1 Regarding the patient 
Recently, watermarking has been proposed for the protection of medical information. 
Basically, watermarking is defined as the invisible embedding or insertion of a message 
in a host document, for example an image. Watermarking provides an original way to 
share a document with some ancillary data like protection data or meta-data. For 
example, with regard to images, watermarked data remains attached at the signal level 
independently of the image file format. It means that embedded data can be recovered 
after file format conversion. 
Most of the work on watermarking for medical images has concerned the need to verify 
image integrity (embedding a digital signature of the image) or improve confidentiality 
[8], as it is often considered that embedding information makes it more difficult for 
unauthorized persons to gain access to this information. Watermarking appears to be 
complementary to other security mechanisms. It gives access to a kind of 
communication channel that is transparent to non-compliant systems, as it is not an 
extra header information addition, while compliant systems will be able to read 
embedded data.  
In the considered framework, access to or sharing of an isolated medical document 
requires that the document can be identified. A watermarked authentication code may 
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allow identification of the health professional who consulted the patient data for the 
purpose of traceability, or the identification of the patient him or herself. To go further, 
if the embedded identity is rendered anonymous [9], then it is possible to gain access to 
and link information concerning the same patient without knowing his or her identity 
so as to guarantee both privacy and interoperability. These patient privacy issues may 
appear during the verification process, which is necessary to reduce the risk of errors 
when identifying documents in everyday practice or when sending a patient's 
Electronic Health Record. For example, the verifier may be able gain access to patient 
data without authorization. This method may also provide a solution to the problem of 
the identification of lost medical documents. Further research and development is 
necessary to extend watermarking methodology to text. 
2.2.2 Regarding the health practitioner 
The medical record transmitted to the patients must be electronically signed by the 
practitioner to be sure that he has given his agreement and that no unauthorized 
modifications have been made. Here also, the recognition of the legal value of the 
electronic signature permits controlled electronic transmission of the medical record to 
the patient. This electronic signature also makes it possible to ensure that any 
modifications of the medical record, for example, adding new medical information, are 
made by the medical practitioner. 
2.3 Data accessibility  
Providing patients with “google-like” secure access to their medical records requires 
the information to be available for querying and retrieval. Google is able to query and 
search all data published on the Internet. But, it will be absolutely necessary to ensure 
the security of this Internet environment before storing any medical data. An alternative 
is provided by grid technology which allows distributed data to be stored securely. This 
data can be consulted and queried according to personal access rights. Grids are 
defined as a fully distributed, dynamically reconfigurable, scalable and autonomous 
infrastructure to provide location independent, pervasive, reliable, secure and efficient 
access to a coordinated set of services encapsulating and virtualising resource. Their 
relevance for managing medical information has been investigated within the 
framework of the HealthGrid initiative [10], [11],[12],[13],[14]. The use of grids 
overcomes the difficulties inherent in a centralized storage system, especially high cost 
and complexity. Grids also make it possible to store data where or very close to where 
they are produced. Through grid authentication, authorization and accounting, only 
duly authorized persons can gain access to data which are encrypted and made 
anonymous when they are transmitted [15]. 
2.4 Technology against ethics and law: the limits of liability. 
Even if grid methodology allows us to solve the most important part of the problem 
concerning secure access of the patient to his or her medical record by embedding a 
strong identification marker in the document through watermarking, two main dangers 
still exist. The first lies in the fact that this process of "automatic" access is not 
accompanied by any medical explanation and even more importantly, there will be no 
medical warning about the contents that the patient will read. It is by no means certain 
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that providing patients with routine direct access to their medical records automatically 
extracted from the database is a very satisfactory solution from a medical point of view. 
If the medical records contain information which may cause serious psychological 
distress (possibly leading to suicide), the hospital or the medical practitioner could be 
held responsible from a legal point of view or at least from an ethical or deontological 
point of view. Moreover, the contents of the medical record also need to be 
conscientiously reviewed (updated or validated) before being delivered to patients. In 
other cases, information contained in a medical record may refer to third persons, and 
divulging such information may be considered a breach of confidentiality. Once again, 
the hospital or the practitioner may be held legally responsible. Therefore, even though 
providing patients with automatic access to their medical records appears to be 
satisfactory from a technical and data-security point of view, it may not fulfil the 
quality requirements for the security of healthcare information. No transmission should 
be allowed without the consent of the medical practitioner who takes care of the patient, 
or his representative. As the practitioner is legally responsible, his formal agreement to 
the transmission is required, and the transmitted document should be electronically 
signed by him. 
The second point lies in the use of the medical record by the patient. As patients are 
deemed to be responsible adults, we will not consider the eventual unexpected effects 
of the communication of their medical records to their insurance company or bank, 
which may have required it officially or unofficially. From a medical point of view, the 
main problem could come from modifications of the medical record by the patient 
himself to erase information that prevents him from obtaining certain advantages. If 
such modifications were possible, imagine what could happen if a patient erased the 
fact that he was epileptic in order to be allowed to drive a machine of some kind. Thus, 
it does not seem desirable to give direct access to the system that manages the files to 
everybody, even authenticated users. The original medical record, which is the means 
to bring evidence in case of litigation, should be protected from any kind of attempt to 
modify the information by unauthorised persons. It will then be preferable to envisage 
a request procedure for access, including the search for the file and the extraction of the 
communicable documents authorized by the law. This approach, in which a special 
access file is created, could happen much faster than the time delay allowed in some 
European countries (in the UK the authorities have 40 days to comply with a Subject’s 
Access request, whereas in France, the delay is 8 days).  
Conclusion 
Thanks to advances in technology it is now possible to envisage access to medical 
records via the Internet anywhere and anytime, thanks to Grid and watermarking 
methodologies. Electronic access will require very strict identity checks using 
cryptographic techniques such as those planned for the electronic signature, which will 
ensure the protection of confidentiality, the integrity of the files, the authentication of 
the applicant's identity and access follow-up. The electronic medical record must also 
be electronically signed by the practitioner in order to provide evidence that he has 
given his agreement and has accepted responsibility, and to prevent any kind of post-
transmission falsification of the record. Currently, the idea that every citizen will have 
an electronic signature allowing him to have direct access to his medical records 
anywhere appears to be Utopian, but this is the implication of much of the work that is 
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going on world-wide in e-Government, e-Health and e-Shopping. With regard to search 
engines, who could have imagined ten years ago that a system would be able to retrieve 
everything you have ever published and list all of the people who have made a 
reference to it in a matter of seconds! 
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